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INTRODUCTION
Derrida and Asian Thought
Steven Burik
Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
More than ﬁfteen years after Jacques Derrida passed away, he remains a controversial
ﬁgure in philosophy. Much maligned, both when he was alive and after his death, Derri-
da’s relation to philosophy proper has always been an uneasy one, not least because of his
relentless questioning of the notion of “philosophy proper” itself. It is this relentless
interrogation of the history and presuppositions of Western philosophy that has made
him an attractive ﬁgure to comparative philosophy. Many of the authors in this
volume, and others beside them, have seen in Derrida a kind of thinking that refuses to
play by the rules of traditional Western philosophy, while at the same time respecting
those rules as well. What Derrida called the double bind is something that I believe
most comparative philosophers struggle with: the need to open philosophy to its other
but at the same time to guard a kind of philosophical integrity and rigor.
While it is certain that Derrida’s openness towards other ways of thinking will continue
to attract a large number of comparative philosophers, it is equally certain that even within
comparative philosophy Derrida remains a controversial ﬁgure. For although he has con-
stantly argued for philosophy to indeed open to its other, his own eﬀorts in this direction
have remained both sparse and checkered. On the few occasions that Derrida actually
mentions other cultures, or non-Indo-European traditions of thought and languages, he
either does so ﬂeetingly without really engaging them any further, quickly returning to
the deconstruction of the West itself, or, as many authors have shown, he does so
without the requisite knowledge of those traditions, inevitably coming to rather hasty
and unwarranted conclusions or leaving many issues unresolved. The criticism levied
against Heidegger (from whom Derrida derives a lot of inspiration), that he was not
really all that interested in non-Western thinking after all, could equally well apply to
Derrida.
And that is not all: there is Derrida’s infamous statement (again following in the foot-
steps of Heidegger) that there is no such thing as Chinese philosophy, recorded on his visit
to China in 2001. If all the above allegations are true, then what explains the continued
attraction of comparative philosophers to the ﬁgure of Derrida? It is my sincere hope
that this special issue will shed some light on this. For, the contributors to this issue
not only show the remarkable aﬃnity of Derrida’s thinking with non-Western thought,
but in the contribution of Ning Zhang we may also ﬁnd elucidations of his engagement
or lack thereof with non-Western thought. In other words, this issue will not only
provide the interested reader with many examples of the applicability of Derrida as an
interlocutor with non-Western philosophy, but it will also seek to clarify his position
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with regard to comparative or intercultural philosophy, and seek to clarify his insistence
that there is no such thing as Chinese philosophy.
Ning Zhang’s contribution does exactly the latter in a compilation from two interviews
she held with Derrida in 1999 and 2000 respectively. In the ﬁrst interview Derrida gives us
a clearer insight into his ideas on the problem of intercultural exchange, especially con-
cerning the question of translation, translatability and untranslatability, as a central
issue of his work. From the second interview, we have chosen to translate the part
where Derrida expresses clearly his views on the relation between philosophy and think-
ing. This interview also clariﬁes his by-now infamous statement that there is no such thing
as “Chinese Philosophy.” Zhang and Derrida also discuss the relation of his work to China,
and for these reasons both these interviews oﬀer a rare and fascinating opportunity to
better understand how Derrida perceived himself in relation to philosophy or thinking
from diﬀerent cultures.
Robert Magliola’s article is an eﬀort to boost the Derrida-Buddhism dialogue. Magliola
ﬁnds intersections between various strands of Mādhyamika Buddhism and Derrida’s
“devoiding” practices. Through a highly engaged exposition of various examples of Der-
rida’s stylistique – that is of his various ways of playing with language, as forms of acting or
playing out his philosophical endeavors – Magliola deftly shows how such playing out
deconstructs forms of entitative thought, such as traditional ideas of identity, univocity,
and correspondence theory, and how this intersects with some key ideas of Mādhyamika
Buddhism.
In a comparison of the paths of thinking of Derrida, Dōgen, and Zhuangzi, Carl Olson
assesses their common endeavors to do philosophy as a kind of play. He thereby attempts
to answer the question of whether engaging in philosophy as a form of play actually helps
or hinders the quest to overcome the representational mode of thinking. Olson shows how
these three protagonists all use a playful way of doing philosophy to upset the traditional
rules of philosophy and challenge common sense notions of reality and representation,
with a view to enlarging their understanding of the world and our place in it, by
“playing” with the minds of their readers. Diﬀerences between Derrida and the other phi-
losophers surface, however, when attempting to answer the aforementioned question.
Rolf Elberfeld’s article compares Derrida with Nishitani with regard to the notion of
“place.” Elberfeld ﬁnds in Derrida’s treatment of Chora close proximities to Asian
thought, and in particular to Nishitani’s philosophy of place (basho, tokoro). Elberfeld
argues that such notions do not refer to actual places, but point us to what is in-apparent
(das Unscheinbare), and speaks of non-being. Both Derrida and Nishitani use such notions
to refer to the limitations of the western obsession with Being and presence. Both try to
open up a new dimension and experience of thinkingwhich is not bound to substantialized
truth; but there is a marked diﬀerence in how they understand this dimension or
experience.
In my own contribution, I explore in how far it is viable to apply Derrida’s thoughts
regarding “trace” to Daoism. I argue that if dao is read in a non-metaphysical way,
then the Derridean idea of “trace” will show large overlaps with dao. I try to show how,
despite obvious historical and philosophical diﬀerences, a “trace” reading of dao can
help develop an understanding of dao that would not necessarily see it as a metaphysical
principle, ineﬀable but transcendent nonetheless, but rather as an immanent working of
the patterned processes that make up both the natural and human world.
2 INTRODUCTION
While each of the articles in this volume stands alone in its own right, one can detect
some commonalities. The concepts of play or playfulness, impermanence, and trace, as
well as ideas and problems concerning language and translation, and the question of
what is philosophy are central concerns that feature in all of the contributions, and it is
our hope that the reader will feel both challenged and inspired by the readings the
authors provide here.
I wish to thank Graham Parkes for his invaluable work during the preliminary stages of
this special issue. I also wish to thank the International Institute for Field-Being for their
permission to republish, with substantial changes, Robert Magliola’s article.
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